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adverse parties, a recent case32 allowed the
accused's wife to testify as to his acts of abuse
toward her during the accused's trial for the
murder of a third person. This decision appears
to have misapplied this exception in view of the
clear language of the applicable statute.P
Conclusion
In determining whether the privilege should
be applied to a given act, courts rely upon
several criteria: (1) the local statute or the
common law rule in force in the jurisdiction;
(2) whether the communication was originally
made in confidence and the extent to which the
marital confidence has been relied upon in
making the communication; (3) whether the
act was accompanied by a communicative intent; (4) the protection to be afforded the relationship under the circumstances (e.g., in the
cases of acts of abuse); and, (5) the prejudicial
character of the evidence under consideration.
The application of the first, second, fourth, and
fifth criteria present relatively few problems.
However, the third criterion, the intent test,
which is closely connected with and parallel to
the second, has presented difficulties to courts
seeking to apply it as a test. Because of these
problems it is submitted that a serious question
"Newman v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 628, 210
S.W.2d 171 (1948).
"tSee TEX. CODE CRI3. PRoc., supra note 19.

exists as to the wisdom of retaining the intent
test as a vehicle for the application of the privilege to acts. It is, at best, a test which must
rest upon nebulous, indefinite, and subjective
assumptions and inferences. The fact that
courts have readily discarded this test and held
acts privileged on other grounds, even where no
intent is apparent, further illustrates the failure
of the intent test as a definitive criterion. In the
second class of cases, examined above, which
present the most difficult problems, the tendency of the courts to apply the Daghitadoctrine
suggests that to a great degree the htaent test
is losing favor.
The inarital co fdeixwe approach of the
Daghitaand similar cases has much to commend
it. It stems from the underlying policy consideration that communications which arise
from the confidential nature of the relationship
should be protected in order to preserve the
relation which society values and which the law
seeks to encourage. Moreover, this approach
suggests a simpler test: would an ordinary and
reasonable person commit the act in question in
the presence of the other spouse were it not for
a natural assumption (growing out of the relationship itself) that the information thereby
gained will be held inviolate? This test assumes
,and is consistent with the policy considerations
underlying the privilege as well as its recognized
exceptions.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
The Equal Protection of the Laws Requires a
State to Provide Free Transcripts of Record to
Indigent Defendants in All Felony CasesDefendants were tried and convicted of armed
robbery; immediately thereafter they filed a
motion in the trial court requesting that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a
stenographic transcript of the proceedings, be
furnished them without cost. They alleged that
they were "poor persons with no means of paying the necessary fees to acquire the transcript
and court records needed to prosecute an
appeal." This motion was denied without a
hearing. The defendants then fled a petition
under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act

under which only questions arising under the
Illinois or Federal Constitutions may be raised.
In these proceedings it was alleged that manifest nonconstitutional errors in the trial required
a reversal of the convictions. It was further
contended that the refusal to provide full appellate review solely because of poverty was a
denial of due process and equal protection. The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of
the petition on the ground that the charges
raised no substantial state or federal constitutional issues. The United States Supreme
Court, in a five to four decision, reversed the
Illinois ruling, holding that destitute defendants
in felony cases must be afforded as adequate
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appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy the transcripts required for full
direct review of convictions. Griffin v. Illinois,
24 U.S.L. WEEK 4209 (April 24, 1956).
The entire court was in substantial agreement
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to provide for any kind of appellate review. However, the majority declared
that once a state does grant this review it must
not "do so in a way that discriminates against
some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty." Thus, any denial of means for adequate review based on the economic position of
the defendants is a "misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special
privilege to none in the administration of its
criminal law. There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends upon
the amount of money he has." But the majority
opinion did not go so far as to require that
Illinois must purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot
buy it. It was indicated that the state could use
alternative means to afford adequate review,
such as a bystanders' bill of exceptions.
The concurring opinion, by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, recognized that this holding might
provide a justification for proceedings both in
state and federal courts by unknown numbers of
convicts on claims that they were unable to
appeal because of lack of money and that this
was a denial of equal protection of the law.
While this was recognized as possibly a burdensome condition, it was felt that this problem was
a small price to pay for the protection of rights
through this "new pronouncement of law."
The dissenting justices argued that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires only that a state refrain from
affirmative discrimination; it does not demand
that the states provide equal financial means for
all defendants to avail themselves of full appellate review in non-capital cases. In support of
the further argument that the Illinois practice
is not a denial of the equal protection of the
laws it was pointed out that the state offers
alternative methods of presenting bills of exceptions to the appellate courts that would not
prejudice indigent felons. On this theory it was
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maintained that the case did not present a
constitutional question for the court to decide.
Request of Jury to Take Notes May Be
Granted over Defendant's Objection-The
defendant was indicted for falsely assuming and
pretending to be an employee of the Veterans
Administration. Shortly after the jury retired a
written communication was transmitted to the
court. In the presence of the defendant, his
counsel and the jury the note was read; the
jury requested that the testimony of six complaining witnesses be read to them and that they
be allowed to take notes as the testimony was
read. The court ruled that the testimony of the
six complaining witnesses be read to the jury,
but that the testimony of the defendant relating
to the transactions need not be read; it was
further ruled that the jury may take notes as
the testimony was read. United States v. Campbell, 138 F. Supp. 344 (N.D.Iowa 1956).
The opinion easily disposed of the first
question relating to the reading of only one side
of the testimony by noting that this was a well
established principle both in the federal and
state courts. However, the problem of the note
taking by the jury presented an issue upon
which there is considerable conflict. The question for the court is whether he must forbid the
practice, not whether he must permit it. Since
only nine states have statutes on the subject,
which give the jury the right to take notes, the
question was resolved by an examination of the
theories lying behind the conflicting views. One
view is that the juror "is to register the evidence, as it is given, on the tablets of his
memory, and not otherwise." This idea is based
on the fear that jurors would be too apt to rely
on what might have been imprefectly written,
and thus make the case turn on only a part of
the facts. The court here recognized that this
might have been valid in the times when many,
if not most, of the jurors were illiterate. However, the opinion pointed out that if there is a
conflict between the recollection of the jurors
and the notes, the jury could request, as was
done here, to have the testimony read again.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that mere notes
would have any undue weight. Besides, it is
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obvious that these notes would be valuable as
memory refreshers; this is why there is no
objection to the fact that the court and counsel
may take notes.
Following the conclusion that note taking by
the jury is permissible, the court added that the
discretion of the judge in this matter would
normally not permit him to bring the matter
to the attention of the jury on his own motion.
Perhaps the only time this might be possible
would be in unusually complex and lengthy
trials. Similarly, it would only be an exceptional
case where a juror would be stopped by the
court from taking notes on his own volition or
where the court should deny the request of the
jury for leave to take notes.
Presence of Same Jurors In Consecutive
Trials of Jointly Indicted Defendants Does Not
Vitiate Findings of Guilt-Defendant was indicted jointly with one Siskin for the crime of
receiving stolen property. Since Siskin had
signed a confession, the defendant's motion for
severance of the trials was granted to avoid the
possibility of guilt by association. Siskin was
tried first and convicted. During his trial no
mention was made of the present defendant's
name other than a reference that he might have
bought some of the stolen property, and Siskin's confession was not put in evidence. In the
defendant's trial it was discovered that three
jurors who had been on the jury in the Siskin
trial were sworn as members of the jury in the
second trial. At this time defendant's counsel
had exhausted all their peremptory challenges,
and did not challenge these three jurors for
cause, believing that the court's ruling on voir
dire that they were "competent" jurors removed challenge for cause. Defendant moved
for a new trial contending that since the key
prosecution witnesses were the same in both
trials, the previous evaluation of their credibility by the three jurors prevented the defendant from receiving a trial on the merits.
The denial of this motion was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals on the ground that the fact
that the jurors belieyed the key witnesses in
both trials did not vitiate the verdict of guilty.
The court, however, did not approve of the

practice of using the same jurors in both trials.
"Hindsight, possessed by everyone, suggests
that it would have been the part of wisdom not
to have called any of the jurors who sat on the
Siskin case to sit on [defendant's] case, inasmuch as serious and vital questions as to
whether a, defendant in a criminal case has had
a fair trial often arise in this way." However,
it was pointed out that the evidence in the two
cases was not the same, although both were
concerned with thefts from the same place.
Furthermore, even though the credibility of the
key witnesses had been passed on before, there
was no reason why a jury in the defendant's
case "would have been more prone to believe
the testimony o the three convicted felons
[the key witnesses] than the testimony of a man
bearing an unquestioned reputation for honesty
[the defendant]." It was more probable, the
court observed, that the other dvidence in the
trial led the jury to its finding of defendant's
guilt. Wirer v. United States, 228 F.2d 944
(6th Cir. 1956).
Scope of State Immunity Statute ExaminedA handbook operator was subpoenaed before
the grand jury to testify concerning an investigation of gambling. He was asked a number of
questions which he declined to answer, claiming
the privilege against self-incrimination. After a
preliminary hearing, the court invoked the
Illinois Witness Immunity Act and ordered the
witness to "answer such relevant and material
questions as might be put to him and granted
him immunity from prosecution for any matters
concerning which he might be required to
testify." After repeated refusals to testify the
witness was convicted of contempt of court.
Under the Illinois Witness Immunity Act,
ILL. R v. STAT. c. 38, § 580a (1953), a witness
charged with a criminal offense whose testimony
would tend to incriminate him may be granted
immunity from prosecution on all charges
which could arise out of his testimony except
perjury. However, this statute does not authorize a grant of immunity if it should reasonably
appear to the court that the testimony would
subject the witness to prosecution under the
laws of another state or the United States. The
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witness contended that his testimony might dis-
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exemption from the basic obligation to testify
impedes the administration of justice. People v.
Burkert, 131 N.E.2d 495 (Ill. 1956).

close possible violations of federal statutes and
regulations relating to the tax on gambling.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction for contempt on the grounds that the
Illinois statute prohibits the entry of an immunity order when there is danger of federal
prosecution arising out of the compelled testimony before any Illinois court or grand jury.
The court held that this immunity statute
affords the witness the protection of the Fifth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution as well
as Section 10 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution. Thus, the state courts must look to
federal decisions in order to determine whether
the testimony will lead to prosecutions under
the federal law. Federal cases have held that the
testimony of a witness will be regarded as not
incriminating only if it is "perfectly clear" that
the testimony will not tend to incriminate the
witness. In applying the federal test to the facts
of this case, the majority stated that it was not
"perfectly clear" that the witness was mistaken
in believing that his testimonywould incriminate
him under federal law.
The dissenting opinion said that the Illinois
act did not require the trial court to be certain
that there would be no prosecution under federal
law before an immunity order was issued. The
dissent claimed that the Illinois act only requires the trial court to be reasonably certain
that prosecution under federal law will not lie,
and if the federal records already disclose the
substance of the alleged incriminating circumstances, possible federal prosecution is no reason
for failing to issue an immunity order. Also, the
trial court can be reasonably certain that the
witness will not be subject to incrimination if
the record indicates that the federal authorities
are not interested in the state investigation of
the witness' activities. It was further contended
by the dissent that under the terms of the
Illinois act the possible incrimination under
federal law must be conclusively determined
before the entry of the immunity order and that
after the immunity order has been entered, the

Use of the Same Person as Complaining
Witness and Prosecutor Is Not Good PracticeDefendant, a justice of the peace, was charged
with assault and battery as a result of an altercation with the county prosecutor. Defendant
overheard a conversation between the county
prosecutor and the clerk of the county court in
which the prosecutor implied that the defendant
had been misappropriating funds collected in
the discharge of his duties as justice of the peace.
Despite defendant's objections, the trial was
conducted by the prosecutor who was also the
complaining witness. In his closing argument
the prosecutor admonished the jury that a
failure to convict would encourage assaults on
public officials and interfere with their actions.
In addition, the prosecutor said that no matter
how large a fine might be assessed against the
defendant someone would come to his rescue
and assume the payment of it.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction of the defendant on the grounds
that the prosecutor's remarks to the jury were
prejudicial and violative of the standard of conduct required of a prosecutor. The remark that
someone other than defendant would pay whatever fine was levied was speculative and not
based on evidence in the record. In addition,
the court said that "coercion is implicit" in the
inflammatory statements of the prosecutor that
no duties would be performed by him if the
defendant were acquitted. While it was not
argued as a basis for reversal, the court indicated disapproval of the complaining witness
acting as prosecutor in this case, saying,
"another attorney should have tried the action
in order to remove the self-interest factor and
thereby reduce to a minimum the display of
passion and prejudice that can scarcely be kept
in abeyance where the same person was the
victim and the prosecutor." May v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1956).

trial court should not inquire into the incriminating quality of the specific questions put to
the witness. The dissent believed that every

Statute Vesting Discretion in Prosecuting
Officials to Charge Carrying of Firearms
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Either as Gross Misdemeanor or Felony is
Unconstitutional-Defendant was charged with
a violation of the state law on carrying firearms without a license, convicted and sentenced
to the penitentiary for ten years. He then
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus charging
that the statute fixing the penalty for the crime
of which he was convicted authorizes the
prosecutor in his discretion to charge a defendant with either a misdemeanor or a felony,
and is therefore unconstitutional. The statute in
question was based on the Uniform Firearms
Statute with certain modifications. It declared
that a violation of the act was "punishable by
a fine or imprisonment for not more than one
year or both or by imprisonment for not less
than one year nor more than ten years." On the
issue of whether this language gives a prosecuting attorney the sole discretion to charge
one who violates the law with either a gross
misdemeanor or a felony, the Washington
Supreme Court held that since the statute
prescribed different punishments or different
degrees of punishment for the same act committed under the same circumstances by persons
in like situations, it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and is unconstitutional. Therefore, the writ was
issued.
The dissenting opinion rejected this construction of the language and stated that the statute
merely provided the trial judge was to have a
wide latitude in the matter of punishment for
violations of the act. The dissent further
argued that if the issue had been framed to ask
the question whether the act authorizes alternative charges, a fair interpretation of the language would deny such authority and sustain
the constitutionality of the law. Application of
Olsen, 295 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1956).
Where Statute Precludes Evidence of Blood
Tests for Intoxication without Defendant's
Consent, Comment on Failure to Take Test is
Prejudicial Error; Recording Machines May
Not Be Substituted for Court Reporter-Following a conviction for operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, the defendant appealed, contending (1)

that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence testimony that he had refused to take a
blood test; and (2) that it was error to direct
that the proceedings be recorded by a magnetic
recording machine instead of by a court reporter. The Supreme Court of North Dakota
sustained both objections by the defendant,
primarily on the basis of applicable state
statutes.
The statute on blood tests for intoxication
which provides that no defendant "shall be required to submit to any chemical test without
his consent" was interpreted as a legislative
grant to an accused of choice of whether or not
he would submit to such a test. This was intended to be a choice "absolutely free and not
encumbered by a liability." If it could be argued
that the refusal to submit to such a test could
be put in evidence and commented upon by the
prosecutor, then the defendant would be faced
with the risk of providing evidence for the
prosecution by submitting to such test, or
certainly provide it by refusing to take the test.
Despite contrary decisions reached in other
jurisdictions, the North Dakota court held that
evidence of a refusal to take a chemical examination must be excluded from the trial.
On the second issue of whether a machine may
be substituted for a court reporter or stenographer as a means of making a record of the proceedings, the court construed statutes requiring
a court reporter to take in shorthand all testimony and proceedings, as giving a party in a
litigated case the right to have a court reporter
take down the proceedings, and excluding the
use of a magnetic recording device. Slale v.
Seuerson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956).
Separation of Jurors Not Established where
Jurors Are Bedded down in Such a Manner
as to Permit Them to Come and Go FreelyDefendant was tried for murder and convicted
of voluntary manslaughter, receiving a sentence
to prison for. twenty-one years. During the
course of the trial the jurors were kept together,
as required by statute. However, overnight the
jurors were placed on the third floor of the local
hotel with the sheriff and two jurors sleeping in
one room and the other eight male jurors sleep-
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ing two in a room. The sheriff stayed in the
room nearest the stairway with the door open.
The five rooms were not all adjoining and the
rooms were not connected, but the doors were
left open all night. The defense contended that
this was not substantial compliance with the
code requirements that the jurors not be allowed
to separate. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction, ordering a new trial,
observing that there was too great an opportunity for the jurors to be tampered with in
this case. Nicholas v. Coninonwealth, 286
S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1956).
The opinion cited several key factors that
prevented the arrangement from meeting the
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standards of the statute. Since the rooms did not
adjoin and the doors remained open during the
whole night, the jurors were free to come and
go as they pleased. There was no arrangement
whereby it was necessary to pass the bed of the
officer in charge if any juror desired to go out.
Any outsider could have had ready access to
any of the jurors. Under the rule that if there is
sufficient opportunity afforded for the exercise
of improper influence, the state must clearly
establish the absence of any harmful influence,
the failure of the prosecution to prove the lack
of harm necessitated a reversal of the conviction.
(Forother recent case abstractssee "Police Science
Legal Abstracts and Notes," infra pp. 302-306)

